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Introduction  
Saudi Arabia’s political order is in the midst of a tentative transformation. After a promising start to 
2003, when de facto ruler Crown Prince Abdallah met openly with activists calling for political 
liberalization, the Saudi reform drive slowed in early 2004.[1] While the pace and extent of 
change remains uneven, there is little doubt that the regime will proceed with some degree of 
political reshuffling. There is reason for optimism, demonstrated by the holding of limited elections 
in 2005, the first of their kind in four decades. Yet, there is also reason for wariness. For, as in the 
past, it is the ruling family’s strategies for managing change as well as the political system more 
generally that generate uncertainty. To understand politics and the political system in the kingdom 
today, and to forecast its future, it is essential to look at the strategic political relationships being 
forged between the state and domestic groups. Of particular importance are the relationships the 
ruling family has cultivated in recent years with some of its boldest and oldest political adversaries, 
who, ironically, now embody both the hope of Saudi Arabia and its potential unraveling: the 
`ulema.  
This article looks at a particularly important and enigmatic cast of characters whose power to 
shape both the social and political arenas in the kingdom, and thus the future of the polity itself, is 
considerable: the sahwa or “awakening sheikhs”, a group of former dissidents who have come to 
support the regime—at least for now. Of particular interest are two of the sahwa’s most prominent 
and remarked upon members, Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, both of whom enjoy 
considerable noteriety for being hard-line and for allegedly continuing to support al Qaeda. That 
they have provided inspiration for radicals in the past is unquestionable, although their present 
role in providing spiritual comfort to militants is less certain. My objective is to outline their current 
significance, the extent to which they have or have not given up their previous criticisms of the 
regime as well as their support for al Qaeda sympathizers, and, to determine the ways in which 
they influence politics in Saudi Arabia.  
I am less interested in determining whom amongst the royal family these clerics and others like 
them have formed specific strategic alliances than I am with the broad outlines of politics. Sorting 
out the former is particularly difficult given the opacity of the Saudi inner circle and is guesswork 
at best. Rather, I am more interested in recent political positioning and shedding some light on 
what these clerics say about politics and the world around them. In this respect some of their core 
principles have changed little from the past, and will continue to be seen as ominous and 
threatening, particularly to the U.S. In other respects, however, their message, when coherent 
and unified, is radically different, thus meriting consideration rather than knee-jerk reprobation. It 
remains to be seen whether or not the sahwa will play a progressive role or a disruptive one. It is 
precisely this uncertainty which is so intriguing and of immediate significance. 
The changes underway in Saudi Arabia, as well as the make-up of most of the “new” political 
actors and forces, have been outlined recently by a number of analysts and observers.[2] In spite 
of external skepticism that claims otherwise, the regime has taken seriously many of the 
challenges facing it, particularly after the emergence of an ongoing domestic militant threat, one 
spearheaded by the al Qaeda affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula.[3] But it was not only the threat of 
local radicalism, nor external pressure regarding global terrorism, that spurred self-reflection and 
the motivation for transformation. Although extremists bent on toppling the regime capture much 
of the West’s attention, a much more constructive network of activists and other figures have 
mounted various appeals for progressive change as well, and have been given some room to 
voice their concerns and aspirations. An inchoate and loosely organized community of political 
activists, what one analyst calls the Islamo-liberal trend[4], has been the most high profile of 
those advocating for reform, although the political field is crowded with other interests as well. 
The attention devoted to new political actors is not surprising, given that the Saudi political 
system has long been closed and that its leaders usually have not encouraged political 
organization or activism.[5] With all this focus on Saudi politics, we still have little analytical depth 
or clarity regarding other networks of political actors in the kingdom, especially those 
sahwa`ulema with whom the regime is forging important but tentative new relations.  
Clerics, the State and the Sahwa 
Historically, Saudi rulers have maintained an intimate relationship with leading `ulema, often 
manipulating the clergy and religiosity to ensure their grip on power.[6] Clerical leaders, in 
exchange for authority over theological, social and cultural affairs in the Saudi polity, initially 
conferred upon the ruling family religious legitimacy as political leaders. The relationship has not 
always been friendly or equal nor have the terms of the original political-religious partnership 
always been observed. Early in the 20 th century, the regime sought to subordinate an 
aggressive and unruly `ulema and its supporters. From 1926-1930, the Saudis faced a serious 
challenge to their power by the very band of holy warriors (ikhwan) that had enabled them to 
conquer much of the Arabian Peninsula. The ikhwan believed that in managing the political affairs 
of the nascent state, the regime had forsaken its religious duties.[7] After defeating the uprising in 
1930 and vanquishing the religious rebels the state proceeded to enroll “the `ulema in an 
amoeba-like embrace and controlled them.” The objective was to limit their political power 
through bureaucratization, thus ensuring that the ‘ulema could never again directly threaten the 
polity.[8] One observer notes that “by the 1950s, the `ulema were firmly in their place as paid civil 
servants, hired and fired by the king.”[ 9] Religion remained a central element in state discourse 
and ideology, although the authority of religious leaders was highly restricted. Saudi rulers 
recognized, or at least maintained, that their authority derived from Wahhabi principles, even if 
few of its monarchs were openly pious or faithful. 
In 1979 a dramatic series of events at home and abroad altered the regime’s posture. The 
occupation of the Mecca Mosque that year by Juhayman al-Utaybi, a descendant of the original 
ikhwan, along with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and open rebellion in the Shi`a communities in 
the oil rich eastern province of the kingdom set in motion a fundamental reorientation of Saudi 
Arabia’s religio-political order. Feeling threatened, the regime responded by re-empowering the 
kingdom’s restive religious elements. The shift in political strategy was profound. King Fahd 
“sought to bolster the legitimacy of the ruling family”, which had been directly challenged by the 
al-Utaybi led rebels, “by appropriating the power of Islam.”[10] The kingdom proceeded to 
undermine domestic critics by co-opting them. The result was the inculcation of the public sphere 
with an austere religious message. In the 1980s, the regime further empowered religious 
institutions by expanding the purview of the mutawwa ,` or religious police, to patrol and monitor 
behavior. It also expanded the network of madrasas  and universities, which “fostered a new 
generation of sheikhs, professors and students,” leading to a widespread Islamic resurgence.[11] 
In addition to its pervasive affect on social and cultural networks in the kingdom, particularly the 
proliferation of religion in all aspects of public life, the regime’s decision to refashion its Islamic 
credentials and promote religiosity also produced political effects. The process of politicization 
followed two tracks. Both laid the roots for what has become a generation of religio-political 
dissent and even violent extremism in the kingdom. First, the regime encouraged religious 
leaders to recruit mujahideen for the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Thousands of jihadis 
traveled to Central Asia. And thousands returned to the Peninsula at the conclusion of the war. 
The legacy of the jihad, particularly the belief that Islam was a powerful political tool that had 
vanquished a global superpower had a profound impact, leading to well-known consequences 
such as the radicalization of Osama bin Laden and his adherents. The politicization of Islam also 
occurred in more subtle yet profound ways, producing wide-ranging if unintended consequences. 
In particular, in seeking to re-forge its conservative religious credentials the regime sought to 
cultivate relations with, and provided succor to, a generation of `ulema who would prove 
controversial and politically contentious.  
The al-sahwa al-islamiyya (Islamic awakening) in Saudi Arabia, which first emerged in the 1960s, 
rose to prominence in the 1980s after the regime turned to its members in an effort to bolster its 
Islamic credentials.[12] Initially the members of the sahwa eschewed political ambition for 
themselves and avoided infringing on the affairs of the state, although they were certainly 
interested in the strengthening of the regime’s theocratic elements. They would not remain on the 
sidelines, however. Gilles Kepel notes that “in allowing the ideologues of the “awakening” to 
speak out publicly and proselytize openly during the 1980s, the royal family had hoped that this 
fringe group of radicals, mostly students, would fall in line with the dynasty’s interests. The 
doctrinal foundations on which the sahwa rested, however, made such an alliance impossible.”[13]  
The sahwa`ulema did not occupy official positions of power. They also did not replace the official 
religious establishment. Yet, they garnered considerable influence and power as a result of the 
regime’s decision to pour money into religious institutions in the decade that followed. “The 
unintentional result was to strengthen the sahwa, which used its strong presence in the 
educational sector to take advantage of the increased funds” creating in them a surrogate for the 
establishment and bestowing on them a kind of quasi-official status, a rank that would both 
embolden them and lead to their demise, at least temporarily.[14]  
The Saudi regime’s decision to rely on American military forces during the 1990-91 Gulf War to 
defend the Peninsula against potential Iraqi aggression radicalized the leading figures of the 
sahwa, particularly the two clerics who have come to be known as the movement’s chief activists 
and ideologues, Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali.[15] They gained widespread popularity 
criticizing the regime by circulating taped audiocassettes of their fiery sermons around the 
kingdom. Their radicalization was further fueled by the emergence of more liberal minded 
dissidents, who called on the regime to embark on an ambitious political reform program, one that 
would open both the political and social fields to more diverse actors and thinking. With 
competing calls for the reform of the political system—the liberals petitioned for a more open 
system, while the sahwa implored for its complete Islamicisation—the regime responded by 
partially placating the former, cracking down on the latter, and attempting to outmaneuver 
both.[16]  
By the middle of the 1990s, al-Awdah and al-Hawali, along with many others, had pushed too 
hard. The regime arrested both of the popular preachers in 1994 and detained them for five years, 
releasing them in 1999. The year also marked the passing of the face of the religious 
establishment Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. Although not always highly popular, it was bin Baz 
that issued a fatwa legitimizing the presence of American forces in 1990, he did enjoy a 
considerable following and credibility.[17] Since the death of the charismatic bin Baz in 1999 and 
his successor bin al-Uthayman in 2001 the establishment clerics have lost much of their popular 
support. In the last four years have the post-imprisoned sahwa clerics, building on the credibility 
and legitimacy they garnered in the 1990s as critics of the regime, have in the eyes of many 
Saudis superceded the official religious establishment with regard to religious authority. Although 
they enjoy a wider following, the sahwa have for now moderated their former positions. The 
International Crisis Group noted in 2004 that “[Salman] al-Awdah, [Awadh] al-Qarni, and [Safar] 
al-Hawali, all former sahwa leaders, toned down their criticism of the state, and the regime began 
to view them more tolerantly. Indeed, with the official religious establishment largely discredited, 
sahwist cooperation was considered highly valuable by rulers in desperate need of religious 
legitimacy.”[18] 
Dissent, Partnership—or Both?  
The role of the sahwa in the current political order is complex. At various times, its members can 
be said to be both supporters and critics of the regime—a remarkable accomplishment 
considering both the short leash given by the ruling family to dissenters as well as some of the 
clerics’ personal history of anti-regime political activism. Since September 11 prominent non-
establishment `ulema have been outspoken in their defense of the Kingdom and their 
condemnation of militancy. Ironically, the sahwa, who had established themselves as the first line 
of dissent against the regime in the 1990s, were replaced by a more virulent brand of jihadi-
centric clerics, who declared rivals as well as those they determined reluctant to support the 
global jihad as takfir (apostates). The takfiri shaykhs included Shaykh Shuaybi, Nasr al-Fahd, Ali 
al-Khudayr, and Ahmed al-Khalidi. The latter three were arrested in the fall 2003 after the 
bombing of a residential compound in Riyadh for their regular support of the jihad. They gained 
widespread attention for subsequently appearing on Saudi television and renouncing their 
support for militancy.[19]  
On May 17, 2003—five days after the fi rst al Qaeda strike against residential compounds in 
Riyadh—fifty clerics, including al-Awdah, al-Hawali and other prominent members of the sahwa, 
signed a statement condemning the May 12 attacks. One observer noted ironically that pre-9/11 
radicals had become reformists.[20] The sahwa’s public support for the regime as well as its 
condemnations of both violence and other political dissent has continued in various forms after 
the Kingdom came under criticism in the wake of September 11 and then direct fire in 2003. 
Shaykh Safar al-Hawali, for example, offered on several occasions in 2003 and 2004 to mediate 
between Saudi based militants and the regime, exhorting the former to surrender to the 
authorities in exchange for limited amnesty. Al-Hawali’s efforts have been doctrinal as well, as he 
has criticized the religious justifications offered by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula for their 
jihad.[21]  
More recent efforts are particularly illustrative of the clerics’ activism on behalf of the regime. In 
December 2004 thirty five `ulema, including Salman al-Awdah and Ayidh al-Qarni, signed a 
statement denouncing efforts by the London based Saudi exile and political dissident Saad al-
Faqih to organize demonstrations and civil disobedience targeting the government. Although he 
did not sign the statement, Safar al-Hawali distributed his own lengthy harangue condemning 
demonstrations and any activities that threatened disorder. Al-Faqih, who has lived in exile since 
the mid-1990s, has long sought the overthrow of the al-Saud. In the early 1990s he was a 
founding member of an early Islamist dissident organization, the Committee for the Defense of 
Legitimate Rights, which operated in conjunction with al-Awdah and al-Hawali’s criticisms of the 
regime. As a result of recent criticism of al-Faqih, there is considerable tension between the 
adherents of al-Faqih’s Harakatal-Islah (The Reform Movement), who are able to follow and 
support al-Faqih through a popular internet discussion forum or via a live satellite radio broadcast 
that can be heard in the Kingdom, and the sahwa shaykhs.[22] In response to the attack on the 
Ministry of the Interior in Riyadh in late December 2004, forty-one clerics issued a statement on 
Salman al-Awdah’s Islam Today website on January 15, 2005 warning against actions and 
discourse that target the regime. Using language similar to that of previous statements, the clerics 
warned against any activity that threatened the security, stability, and the unity of the country. 
They also remarked that bombings and destruction in the name of religion “distorts the image of 
Islam and increases the reasons for attacks on places of worship and the prescriptions of Islamic 
Law.”[23] 
The `ulema’s support for the regime is not unconditional. They remain controversial, provocative 
and confrontational. The sahwa have consistently agitated against the regime’s close relationship 
with the United States as well as what they perceive to be aggression against religious beliefs 
and rituals in the Kingdom.[24] Deep distrust of American foreign policy and the suspicion that the 
U.S. seeks to remold Saudi religious institutions and relationships in its own image form the 
substance of a popular anti-Americanism and sermonizing against Westernization. While anger 
and cynicism regarding the U.S. has led to criticism of Saudi domestic liberal reformers as well as 
reform efforts that are deemed to West-oriented, direct anger with the U.S. as well as its close 
relationship with the Saudi regime has manifested in conflicts that have little to do with reform. In 
fact, there are indications that several members of the sahwa are willing to cooperate with 
aspects of reform, including sitting down with Shiites.[25] Since the beginning of the Iraq war, 
however, it is an anti-U.S. policy platform that frames much of their politics, and, that has created 
tension between them and the Saudi regime. 
In November 5, 2004, on the eve of the U.S. siege on the Iraqi city of Falluja, 26 Saudi clerics, 
including both al-Awdah and al-Hawali, signed an “open letter to the Iraqi people” that called for 
Iraqis to join in a defensive jihad against the U.S. military occupation. The fatwa has received 
considerable attention, although little analysis, let alone consideration of its significance in the 
Saudi domestic political arena. The fatwa made the case for violence against U.S. forces in Iraq, 
noting that “jihad against the occupation was mandatory for those who were able.” For those 
unable to participate themselves, the statement did forbid “harming any member of the 
resistance,” which the clerics did not bother to define, as well as forbidding “any Muslim from 
providing support or assistance to military operations on behalf of the occupying soldiers.” The 
fatwa has widely been interpreted as an endorsement of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and his 
operations in Iraq. This is unlikely. The statement unequivocally condemned all Muslim–on-
Muslim violence as unjustifiable and determined that strikes against non-military targets were 
harmful to the interests of Iraqis and Muslims everywhere. The statement even called for Shiites 
and Sunnis in Iraq to work together in confronting the forces of the occupation, contradicting 
Zarqawi’s very public appeal for sectarian war as well as some of the signatories’ own past 
violently anti-Shiite discourse. While the signatories made clear that opposition to the occupation 
was necessary, they also made clear that it was time for more constructive activities as well. They 
wrote “the country is now forming—those who are pioneers will be influential, especially if they 
perfect their management, practical courage, and organized institutional efforts. This is why 
schools, mosques and other means should be used to guide the people to rely on other media, 
news, radio stations, satellite stations, newspapers, magazines, lectures and seminars that are 
based on truthful beliefs and an understanding without bias—personal or partisan—and are 
detached from narrow loyalties and short-sighted views, detached from sectarian factioning that 
will lead to fragmentation, quarrels and fighting.”[26] The statement did not exhort Saudis or 
Muslims from outside Iraq to travel there to fight the Americans, although they did vaguely 
encourage “our Muslim brothers to stand by their brothers in Iraq by…supporting them as much 
as possible.” Nevertheless, while the November 2004 fatwa was not an endorsement of al Qaeda, 
it was also not a reflection of a moderate political position. It clearly demonstrated that both jihad 
and other violence were justified within certain boundaries and especially against the U.S. and its 
interests, a position constituting a real dilemma for the royal family. 
Interestingly, the position of sahwa clerics was not uncontested inside Saudi Arabia. The 
publication of the fatwa on Salman al-Awdah’s website also coincided with a series of daily 
newspaper columns written by another Saudi cleric, Abd al-Mohsen al-`Ubaykan. On the pages of 
the Arabic language London based daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Al-`Ubaykan wrote throughout 
Ramadan that the anti-occupation violence in Iraq was not jihad and could not be justified on 
religious grounds. Another columnist for the paper, Husayn Shubakshi, who was fired from his 
post in a local Saudi paper in 2003 for criticizing the forces of conservatism in the Kingdom, wrote 
that al-Ubaykan was an “Islamic star”. In a November 10, 2004 column in al-Sharq al-Awsat , 
Shubakshi proclaimed that for Saudi readers to “vote for al-`Ubaykan!” for his Islamist activism in 
the print and television media.[27] Al-`Ubaykan’s efforts invited scorn from supporters of 
hardliners, as evidenced by scathing commentary found on various Islamist websites, including 
that of Saad al-Faqih. He was widely pilloried for what was perceived as favoring the U.S. in its 
struggle against Muslims. It is unclear if the twenty-six supporters of the jihad fatwa were directly 
criticizing al-`Ubaykan and his stand, although they did warn against the issuing of “confusing 
fatawa” that distracted from the defense of Islam—just vague and broad enough to mean 
anybody. 
While the sahwa may not have resolutely supported al Qaeda and terrorism, they are 
nevertheless walking a knife-edge. Their continued support for jihad in Iraq and elsewhere 
against the U.S. puts them in direct opposition to the royal family and the Saudi regime itself, 
which fashions itself a strong ally of America. Their continued hard-line has certainly been 
interpreted in the U.S. as providing tacit if not direct succor for militants. There are suggestions 
that the sahwa, particularly al-Hawali and al-Awdah, condemn terrorism at home while supporting 
it abroad in order to garner both support from the Saudi state and the Saudi people.[28] The 
reality is that they need not appeal to al Qaeda outside the Kingdom to garner political support 
when their outspoken anti-American position has so much public appeal and resonance. It is 
precisely on this point, however, that they part ways with the regime, threaten its alliances and 
perhaps invite future trouble. The “jihad fatwa”, when read in the context of the Saudi domestic 
political arena, reads as a direct criticism of the Saudi state’s close relationship with the United 
States. It is this strategic relationship which has in the past divided the sahwa and government 
camps and which could drive a wedge between them again. For now, the two camps continue to 
forge a strategy of co-existence if not total mutual support. The clerics believe that the continued 
survival of the royal family is in the best interest of stability in the Kingdom as well as a providing 
them renewed power to spread their religious message. It is a fragile peace at best, however.  
Disturbingly, the issuing of the jihad fatwa, as well as subsequent statements about political 
activities in the kingdom including those that support the regime, mark the increasing politicization 
of the sahwa. For the most part, since the release of al-Awdah and al-Hawali from prison in 1999, 
their activities focused on social and religious affairs. The intensification of their writings and 
public commentary on foreign and domestic politics in 2003 and especially in the second half of 
2004 is potentially ominous, however. If the clerics continue to grow emboldened and wield an 
anti-U.S. agenda to expand their base of support, they will come to believe that they are both able 
and entitled to influence the political future of the kingdom from a position of leadership, rather 
than partnership. They do not and likely will not directly threaten the interests of the United States 
in Saudi Arabia or in the Middle East. However, from their support for jihad does help perpetuate 
an atmosphere of frustration and anger. It also distracts the royal family from dealing with urgent 
domestic issues having to do with political reform. More importantly, while the royal family no 
doubt appreciates the sahwa’s efforts to support the regime against both internal and external 
political pressures, it will view with suspicion the efforts of sahwa leaders to expand their own 
influence by addressing domestic politics and, in particular, the Kingdom’s strategic relationship 
with the United States. 
A United Front?  
On matters related to foreign policy, especially their renunciation of what they characterize as 
American aggression against Islam as well as the repudiation of Islamist militants and the threat 
they pose to stability inside the Kingdom and out, the sahwa clerics stand united. There are 
important divergences when it comes to domestic politics, however. They agree that the `ulema’s 
control over religious matters, such as education and gender affairs, should remain undisputed. In 
response to domestic stirrings in late 2003 that the Saudi educational system needed reform, for 
example, the clerics issued a statement challenging any effort to re-shape local schools and the 
educational curricula, particularly efforts to Westernize it. The clerics also agree that Islam should 
remain the central framework for political life in the Kingdom.  
On other matters, particularly those related to the supporting of pluralism and acknowledging 
diversity in the Kingdom, there is less unity or coherence in the sahwa’s position. Salman al-
Awdah, for example, attended National Dialogue meetings in 2003 and is even said to have 
reportedly tacitly supported the December 2003 reform petition signed by other members of the 
sahwa calling for the creation of a Constitutional Monarchy.[29] Perhaps even more notable given 
the vehemence with which members of the sahwa have previously condemned Shiites as infidels, 
even calling for nothing short of ethnic cleansing against them in the past, al-Awdah met 
personally with the Shiite cleric Shaykh Hassan al-Saffar in 2003. Ayidh al-Qarni, another 
prominent supporter of the sahwa, visited Shiite communities and leaders in the Eastern Province 
in 2004. Not surprisingly, he endured some rancor and the venting of years of frustration from 
Shia citizens angry about years of hate-speech targeting them. Even so, the visit was symbolic 
and signified that there are possibilities of coexistence in Saudi Arabia.[30] When asked about 
whether he believed in the sincerity of al-Awdah’s and al-Qarni’s softened line, one Shia 
community leader told me in February 2005 that at the very least he was happy that some of the 
clerics had stopped the vicious ethnic and religious attacks. But, caution rules in the Shiite 
communities, particularly since key sahwa figures such as al-Hawali specifically refuse to 
participate in any dialogue with the Saudi Shia.[31] 
Differences regarding the Shia are only one sign that there is limited uniformity in the sahwa 
camp. Gilles Kepel noted that al-Awdah and al-Hawali started to go their separate ways as early 
as 1999, particularly as al-Awdah sought to improve his standing with the royal family. He 
“ presented a new profile intended to make him appear suitable to occupy the space left empty by 
the deaths of Bin Baz and Bin Uthayman.”[ 32] Moreover, Safar al-Hawali’s reluctance to meet 
with Saudi Shiites reflects his deeper ambivalence about the Saudi reform project altogether. Al-
Hawali continues to adhere to the line he developed in his 1986 Ph.D. dissertation that 
sovereignty belongs to God alone—a challenge both to the idea that Saudi citizens should enjoy 
more participation in governance as well as to the royal family itself.  
The differences between al-Awdah and al-Hawali are not insignificant. Al-Hawali in particular is 
threatening to the current political balance, considering his more reserved approach to the 
domestic political changes underway as well as his closer relations with militants in the kingdom. 
Their differences, however, are not enough to unsettle the powerful convictions they share 
regarding the U.S., its policy in the region, and inside the kingdom, especially when U.S. interests 
threaten the power of the sahwa and its members’ grip on religious authority. In the current 
political climate inside Saudi Arabia, it is precisely their position regarding the U.S. that provides 
them with credibility and power. It is also this position that most seriously threatens the 
government, which continues to struggle to formulate an earnest reform program that does not 
alienate its religious partners. For the moment, it is difficult to discern who is beholden to whom, 
the sahwa to the state or vice-versa. It is clear, though, that the relationship is precarious and that 
the future of politics in the kingdom hinges to a great extent on how it develops. Should the more 
moderate amongst the sahwa find support and space to evolve, there is reason to hope that a 
temperate form of Islamism can take root and help stabilize Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, the 
opposite is also entirely possible. 
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